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Abstract 
This article consists of a review of Jürgen Habermas’s discussions of the dilemma posed by 
human global interdependence to the possibility of democratic politics. According to 
Habermas, since the Second World War, and in a process that has become only more 
pervasive since the end of the Cold War, human societies have been brought into increasingly 
tighter and more complex political, social and economic networks of interdependence that 
have ultimately undermined the capacity of state-based democratic publics to have some 
degree of influence over their conditions of existence. From a critical international theory 
perspective, Habermas’s argument highlights the fundamental contemporary challenge faced 
by the social sciences in general, and International Relations (IR) in particular. From that 
perspective, the fundamental task of IR is not only to explain world politics, but also to 
orientate social and political practice towards an expansion of democratic control over them. 
The purpose of this article is to show how Habermas’s work makes a fundamental contribution 
to improve that critical orientating role of IR. The article connects Habermas’s more recent 
political writings on the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) with his earlier 
work on the development of a theory of social evolution. In doing so, it shows how Habermas’s 
work can constitute the basis for an approach to the study of world politics that both 
understands how the present dilemma between global complexity and democracy came to be 
the defining feature of the present stage of human development, and that discloses the 
immanent potential gathered by modernity for a radical expansion of democratic politics to 
the level of world politics. 
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JÜRGEN HABERMAS AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF WORLD POLITICS 
 
 
André Saramago1 
 
 
Introduction 
Throughout his vast career, Jürgen Habermas has been engaged in the development of 
a theory of social evolution that captures the dynamics of human historical development. 
In this context, Habermas came to characterise the history of the species as a long-term 
collective learning process in two interrelated fields; that of moral-practical knowledge 
and that of technical-instrumental knowledge (Habermas, 1987). While the former refers 
to learning at the level of collective norms that regulate social life, the latter refers 
predominantly to learning in the areas necessary to the material reproduction of social 
life, namely the control of non-human nature through productive activities. Habermas's 
argument is that, throughout history, different stages of development of moral-practical 
knowledge have been embodied in human societies’ social norms and background shared 
moral understandings (what Habermas refers to as the 'lifeworld'), while different stages 
of technical-instrumental knowledge have been embodied in the economy and related 
spheres, such as bureaucratic and technical administrations (what Habermas refers to as 
the 'system'). Habermas's argument is that as human societies develop and become 
more complex, there is a rising tension between lifeworld and system. If, on the one 
hand, moral-practical learning creates the possibility to exercise greater democratic 
control over social life, on the other hand, social complexity creates pressures towards 
greater systemic autonomy, with bureaucratic and economic social sectors assuming 
dynamics of their own that escape democratic politics (Habermas, 1987).    
In the last 20 years, Habermas (1996; 2001; 2012) came to argue that modernity faces 
a fundamental ‘systemic problem’ that, with the global interweaving and interdependence 
of humanity brought about by globalization processes, now encompasses the whole 
world. A core feature of this problem is how, with the integration of national economies 
in a global capitalist market, and especially with the radical liberalization of financial 
markets since the end of the gold standard in 1971, there has been a dramatic increase 
in the autonomy of systemic contexts in relation to democratic publics that have 
remained state-bound (Habermas, 2001). This has undermined the balance between 
democracy and systemic autonomy that had been achieved within welfare states since 
the end of the Second World War. It is also the source of the contemporary resurgence 
of ethno-nationalist movements calling for a reinforcement of state sovereignty as a 
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supposed solution to the unplanned harmful social consequences of a global capitalist 
system that is out of control (Haro, 2017). However, to Habermas, a return to the state 
is an illusory escape from the problem. Rather, his argument is that it is necessary to 
develop a new 'principle of organisation' for world politics; one capable of expanding 
social adaptive capacity to the developmental challenges posed by growing global 
interdependence (Habermas, 2012).  
In this context, Habermas has been mainly concerned with identifying the cognitive 
potential, available in modern worldviews and consciousness structures, for the 
development of such a principle of world political organisation that changes the prevalent 
balance between state-based democratic constituencies and global autonomous systems. 
In particular, Habermas is interested in understanding how the process of 
democratisation of social life, already initiated at the level of welfare democratic states, 
can be extended to world politics in a manner that reinforces human collective and 
conscious control over the systemic character of inter-state relations and the global 
capitalist economy. 
Habermas’s arguments in this regard are analysed in the following four sections. First, 
the article addresses Habermas’s observations on how human global interweaving 
undermines the degree of democratic control that citizens of democratic welfare states 
are capable of exercising over their conditions of existence. Second, it considers 
Habermas’s argument that a reconstruction of Kant’s project for perpetual peace is 
required as an orientating framework regarding how the global web of humanity can be 
organised in a manner that guarantees a greater degree of collective and conscious 
control over its future development. Third, it analyses the connection between this 
argument and Habermas’s more recent writings on the European Union, and on the 
decoupling between democracy and state power that can occur in its context. And fourth, 
the article addresses how Habermas’s analysis of the EU informs his boulder proposal for 
a reform of the United Nations and associated radical democratization of world politics.  
 
Global interdependence and democracy 
Since 1971, with the end of the gold standard and subsequent radical liberalization of 
financial markets, the systemic dynamics of capitalism were unleashed from the 
boundary conditions established by national democratic publics and became capable of 
developing out of their own accord in conditions of greater autonomy. The capacity to 
freely move capital across the webs of the world economy meant that, increasingly, 
important areas of society were submitted to relations on the basis of money as the main 
means of social integration (Habermas, 2001: 78). This permitted multinational 
companies to withhold investment in certain states or social areas, blocking the access 
to important sources of revenue through taxation, unless states underwent reforms to 
make their internal conditions more adequate to the needs and interests of capitalist 
corporations. States have thus become increasingly compelled to compete with each 
other in making themselves more attractive to global business interests, namely, through 
the privatisation of areas such as health and education, the reduction of workers’ salaries 
and benefits, the extension of working hours, and a combination of increased taxes for 
citizens with a reduction of corporate taxes (Habermas, 2001: 79).  
Under these conditions, welfare states’ social security systems, designed to alleviate the 
negative effects of capitalist development, became overburdened with rising 
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unemployment and a shorter taxation basis. Increasingly, then, welfare states became a 
channel for the systematisation of national lifeworlds by global systemic imperatives and 
lost the capacity to guarantee democratic control over capitalist dynamics. Accompanying 
the growing intricacy of global economic networks, there also emerged unplanned chains 
of interlocking political decisions and outcomes that, when combined with the way that 
cultural and political identities are reshaped and rekindled by such processes, have made 
many local and regional sub-state actors question the legitimacy of the nation-state as a 
representative and accountable centre of power (Habermas, 1973; Habermas, 2006; 
Held, 1995: 136). The process of globalisation has thus 'enmeshed' nation-states in the 
dependencies of an increasingly interconnected world society whose systemic contexts 
'effortlessly bypass territorial boundaries' (Habermas, 2006: 175; see also: Walker, 
1988).  
One of the answers to this situation has been the hegemonic behaviour exhibited by the 
United States (US) in the last two decades. Recent attempts by the superpower to use 
its military, technological and economic superiority to create a global order compatible 
with its ‘religiously coloured notions of good and evil’ constitute an expression of the 
historical possibility for the emergence of an ‘imperial answer’ to the challenge of 
regulating global interdependence (Habermas, 2006: 149). However, according to 
Habermas, the most likely outcome of the continued pursuit of such a strategy, given the 
inevitable resistance on the part of other great powers, such as Russia and China, is the 
emergence of a ‘Schmittian’ world order, characterized by the ‘alarming prospect of 
competition among hemispheres’ (Habermas, 2006: 148). Such a global order would, in 
effect, undermine the possibility of collective control over the process of globalisation, as 
the unplanned dynamics arising out of great power competition would push people and 
states into patterns of interaction not intended by any of them, and with potentially 
harmful implications for all the participants.  
Instead, Habermas (2012) proposes an alternative ‘principle of organisation’ for world 
politics in the form of an extension, to the level of international society, of the long-term 
process of democratisation of social life that has hitherto been confined to the intra-state 
level. The democratic-legal taming of state power that has been occurring within welfare 
states needs to be carried further, in the form of a democratisation of the international 
system of states, that pacifies relations between states and controls their anarchic 
competition for power. Furthermore, such pacification would create the conditions for the 
establishment of new supranational procedures and institutions, as well as new forms of 
solidarity between people, on the basis of which a higher degree of conscious and 
collective control might come to be exercised over the dynamics of the global economic 
system.  
In this context, Kant’s project for perpetual peace is suggested as the most compelling 
alternative to the hegemonic proposal. However, it is also found to be in need of 
‘reconstruction’ in light of Habermas's own research into long-term processes of legal 
pacification of state power.  
 
The political constitution of world society 
Kant’s project is built on the awareness of the internal connection between peace and 
freedom (Kant, 2015; Habermas, 2006: 175). Only under conditions of international 
peace can human beings exercise a sufficient degree of control over inter-state relations 
 JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations 
e-ISSN: 1647-7251 
Vol. 10, Nº. 1 (May-October 2019), pp. 14-28   
Jürgen Habermas and the democratization of world politics  
André Saramago 
 18 
 
that guarantees they are capable of freely self-determining their conditions of existence 
and not be dragged by the unplanned dynamics of inter-state competition and conflict. 
Both the pacification and the greater control of inter-state relations can be achieved, in 
Kant’s view, through the establishment of a code of law regulating all possible dimensions 
of human interdependence (Kant, 1991). Respectively, civil law regulating relations 
between citizens within a state; international law regulating relations between states; 
and cosmopolitan law regulating relations between states and human beings in their 
quality of world citizens.  
In Habermas's interpretation, (though there are others, see: Kleingeld, 2012; Mikalsen, 
2011) Kant considers that such a code of law requires the constitution of a world 
federation of republican states with coercive powers to ensure its compliance.  An 
understanding that Habermas contests by noticing how the actual historical development 
of international law since Kant’s time leads to a different conclusion. Namely, that there 
is an important difference between the development of legal control over state power 
within states, and legal control over state power in the relations between states 
(Habermas, 2006: 122). The former implies a process in which an already existent 
monopoly over the means of legitimate violence comes to be circumscribed in its 
operation by civil laws that, concomitantly, depend on that same monopoly to guarantee 
their compliance. In the latter case, there is no supranational monopoly over the means 
of legitimate violence to ensure the application of international law. Rather, international 
law is developed and guaranteed on the basis of the expectation of self-restraint on the 
part of states. Hence, the development of international law ‘runs counter’ to the 
development of civil law, given that the main challenge at the level of international 
relations is how to make international law effective, and not how to tame and legitimize 
the power of an already existent monopoly over the means of legitimate violence 
(Habermas, 2006: 172). At the international level thus occurs what Habermas (2006: 
134) refers to as a ‘decoupling’ of law and state power, which does not occur at the intra-
state level.  
If taken into account, this ‘decoupling’ shows that Kant’s model of a ‘democratic federal 
state writ large – the global state of nations or world republic – is the wrong one’ 
(Habermas, 2006: 134). It is wrong not only because it understands the pacification of 
world politics as a reproduction of the process that already took place at the intra-state 
level, but also because it envisions that the monopoly over the means of legitimate 
violence and international law remain fused in a single institution, the world federation 
of states. Instead, an analysis of the actual historical development of international law 
reveals a decoupling between state power and law, which opens up the possibility for an 
alternative to Kant’s world federation (see: Beardsworth, 2011: 32).   
According to Habermas, this alternative is found in the possibility of a ‘decentred world 
society’, as a ‘multilevel’ global order that lacks the character of a state, but ensures 
collective democratic control over the dynamics of both the inter-state and the global 
economic systems (Habermas, 2006: 136).  This multilevel world society implies not only 
the constitution of the three levels of law envisioned by Kant – respectively, the civil, the 
international and the cosmopolitan – but also the creation of three levels of decision-
making. First, the supranational level of a world organization which is responsible for the 
clearly circumscribed tasks of securing peace and protecting human rights without, 
however assuming the state-like character of a world federation of states. Second, the 
transnational level in which great powers and continental unions of states address 
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economic, social and ecological problems within the framework of permanent 
conferences. And third, the national level in which each state’s lifeworld, expressed in 
their respective public spheres, can reacquire democratic control over national state 
power and the globally-connected national economy, given their integration in the 
multilevel world society (Habermas, 2006: 136). By stressing the plurality of legal orders 
in a politically constituted world society, Habermas effectively rejects the notion that law 
should form a unitary and hierarchical normative system, instead envisioning the 
coordination of legal orders to be guaranteed not by a vertical chain of authority, but 
rather by the performance of deliberative processes of consensualization of norms at 
different levels of decision-making. 
Habermas (2006: 136) notes that, at the present historical juncture, only ‘natural great 
powers’, such as the USA, Russia or China, have the necessary resources to operate at 
the transnational level and establish continental regimes regulating economic, social and 
environmental policies in their respective areas of the globe. Consequently, in order to 
further give shape to this politically constituted world society, states in the various ‘world 
regions have to unite to form continental regimes on the model of the European Union’ 
(Habermas, 2006: 136). With this proposal for the political constitution world society, 
Habermas intends to show that a ‘world republic’ is not the only institutional form that 
the Kantian project can assume, nor is it the most adequate orientating device for how 
to pursue the pacification and democratization of world politics, given the cognitive 
potential gathered by world historical development (Beardsworth, 2011: 32) 
The next two sections address in greater detail Habermas's reflections on the 
transnational and the supranational levels of his envisioned multilevel world society by 
focusing, first, on his discussion of the European Union and, afterwards, on his proposals 
for the reform of the United Nations.   
 
The European model 
Habermas’s most elaborate proposal for the political constitution of world society is found 
in the compilation of texts entitled The Crisis of the European Union: A Response (2012). 
There, he argues that, under conditions of global interdependence, human beings can 
only attain a greater degree of democratic control over the global systemic dynamics that 
threaten them with environmental, economic and social disruption via the constitution of 
continental unions of states responsible for the regulation and coordination of policies in 
their respective areas of the globe.  
The European Union (EU) is the longest surviving effort at extending the pacification of 
social life initiated within states to the international level. This effort has been developed 
in order to not only pacify the inter-state relations of a continent ‘drenched in blood’ but 
also to develop decision-making and steering capacities that enable European states to 
collectively exercise a greater degree of control over the dynamics of the international 
and economic systems that affect the continent as a whole and ignore state borders 
(Habermas, 2012: 28). An essential aspect of this process has been the development of 
European law regulating state behaviour without, however, the constitution of a 
European monopoly over the means of legitimate violence. The innovations coming into 
being in the EU can thus, in time, serve as a reference for other, less integrated, regional 
institutions (Habermas, 2001). In particular, the fact that European law is obeyed and 
has its own constituency independently of domestic law and state power sets a 
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'precedent' for regional and global politics, effectively posing a new relation between law 
and power. This new relation is argued to provide a new 'model' for political organisation 
at the regional and global levels (Habermas, 2012, see also: Beardsworth, 2001: 98).  
However, Habermas also notes that the democratization process in the context of the EU 
is far from finished. One of the main challenges is the fact that European economic 
integration has not been matched by the creation of democratic political institutions 
capable of regulating the common market. The EU's continued reliance on economic 
interdependence driven by business interests as the main integrative and pacifying force 
on the continent is 'no longer acceptable' without a concomitant effort to match the logic 
of market efficiency with the democratization of European political institutions 
(Habermas, 2012, Verovšek, 2012: 369). Decision-making processes at the level of the 
EU thus continue to be predominantly shaped by relations of power between states that 
escape the influence of national public spheres, while producing decisions that have a 
profound effect on the conditions of existence of the populations of each state. Hence, 
European law, while enabling the self-regulation of the European system of states, 
frequently lacks legitimacy in the eyes of European citizens given how it is not constituted 
by deliberative processes of consensualization between all those who stand to be affected 
by it (see: Linklater, 2007; Fraser, 2007). The present character of the EU is thus better 
described as form of ‘executive federalism’, in which the European Council, composed of 
representatives of each state, enacts measures that are implemented at the national 
level through governmental majorities that disempower national parliaments and escape 
the control of deliberative national publics (Habermas, 2012: 28). As such, national 
governments and bureaucratic administrations can use European institutions to escape 
the regulation of national public spheres and recover a degree of systemic autonomy 
from the normative constraints of national lifeworlds.  
Habermas thus sees the EU as a highly contradictory social formation. On the one hand, 
it has contributed to the pacification of European inter-state relations and to the 
development of European institutions with the capacity to extend legal and democratic 
control over systemic forces that have bypassed national boundaries. But, on the other 
hand, these same institutions reinforce the autonomy of state power vis-à-vis national 
lifeworlds and diminish the level of collective democratic control that people are capable 
of exercising over their lives, becoming a 'kind of post-democratic, bureaucratic rule' 
(Habermas, 2012: 52). The EU is a 'paradox' to the extent that it shows marked 
tendencies for a deepening of its democratic deficit while also gathering the potential to 
serve as a vehicle for the extension of democratic governance beyond the nation-state 
and thus for the development of democratic boundaries on the 'socially corrosive' impacts 
of globalisation (Habermas, 2001; Grewal, 2001). 
The EU stands at a crossroads in Habermas's assessment. On the one hand, it faces the 
danger of a deepening of its democratic deficit by becoming a conveyer belt for the 
transformation of national lifeworlds according to the systemic pressures of state 
bureaucracies and capitalist interests. On the other hand, the historical development of 
European institutions and the legal pacification of the continent constitutes a 'novel' event 
in world politics that gathers the immanent potential for extending democratic decision-
making to the transnational level of world society. Such an extension would permit the 
constitution of a European ‘transnational democracy’ that further approximates an ‘ideal 
communication community’ (Habermas, 2012: 52).  
 JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations 
e-ISSN: 1647-7251 
Vol. 10, Nº. 1 (May-October 2019), pp. 14-28   
Jürgen Habermas and the democratization of world politics  
André Saramago 
 21 
 
The main difficulty facing the democratization of the EU, Habermas observes, is that, 
except for the European Parliament, democratic institutions of decision-making continue 
tied to the state level. In this context, some have argued that the democratization of the 
EU is impossible given the absence of a common 'demos' beyond European nation-states, 
a collective European identity that creates bonds of solidarity between European citizens 
and makes them a single constitutional subject (Dahl, 1999). The ‘no demos’ thesis can, 
however, be contested in light of Habermas’s theory of social evolution that notes that 
while the ‘nation’ has served as the basis for political community at the state level, it has 
done so only to the extent that it was the historical solution to the tension inherent in 
the identity of modern citizens. A tension between their universal moral character, which 
is ‘better suited to world citizens’, and the reality of the fragmentation of world politics 
between different nation-states (Habermas, 1979: 115). As such, inherent in the moral 
orientations of modernity is already present the cognitive potential to overcome the 
‘nation’ as the main principle of organisation for political communities (Habermas, 2006: 
76).  
In modern, universalistic worldviews and consciousness structures lies the potential for 
the validity and legitimacy of social norms to derive less from being grounded in ethno-
nationalist identities than in universal principles that have been constituted via 
deliberative processes of consensualization involving all those who stand to be affected 
by them. This deliberative character of the validity and legitimacy of law implies its 
decoupling from the background of shared national traditions. Decision-making processes 
concerning common problems can thus be informed by 'principles of justice' rather than 
in terms of the ‘fate of the nation’, given how people’s ‘emotional fixation’ can move from 
the ethno-national community to the deliberatively constituted law (Habermas, 2006: 
77-78). Increasingly, ‘civic solidarity’ can be defined not by belonging to a common 
nation-state, but instead by a common allegiance to deliberatively achieved constitutional 
principles embodied in law. From that perspective, it becomes possible to conceive of an 
'enlargement' of civic solidarity and of the boundaries of political community to 
encompass non-nationals and outsiders as rightful members of a transnational dialogic 
community of co-legislators who are bound by their affectability by common norms, 
rather than by shared cultural orientations or political aspirations (Linklater, 1998: 85; 
2017). Habermas calls this transnational civic solidarity ‘constitutional patriotism’ 
(Habermas, 2006: 53; Habermas, 2006b: 118).  
Constitutional patriotism expresses a possible new principle of organisation for welfare 
states and world politics that permits the expansion of civic solidarity beyond the frontiers 
of the 'nation'. It points to the possible emergence of a European-wide civic solidarity 
that binds together in a ‘post-national constellation’ people from different states through 
a shared allegiance to the principles of European law, which they collectively recognise 
as legitimate and valid if these principles derive from deliberative processes of decision-
making involving all those who stand to be affected by them. The cognitive potential for 
the development of European transnational democracy is thus already present in the 
modern worldviews and consciousness structures of the citizens of modern European 
welfare states. 
In fact, according the Habermas, the partial actualization of this cognitive potential of 
modern world views can already be observed in the growing decoupling of European law 
from state power. The Lisbon treaty is an expression of this process when, in the absence 
of a European monopoly over the means of legitimate violence, derives the legitimacy of 
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European law from constitutional principles that have been constituted by the EU's ‘dual 
constitutional subject’, which is defined as the national peoples (represented by their 
states) and the citizens of the European Union (Habermas, 2012: 37). In Habermas’s 
view, the Lisbon treaty thus confirms de jure what the EU has historically denied de facto; 
i.e. that the legitimacy of European law can only be secured if it derives from democratic 
deliberative processes of decision-making involving both the citizens and the member-
states of the Union. Consequently, the present decoupling of European law from state 
power on which the EU is structured, as well as the validity of European law, can only be 
maintained if the Union actualises the ideal of the political constitutionalization of world 
society at the transnational level and makes the ‘dual constitutional subject’ of the Union 
an institutional reality (see: McCormick, 2007). 
The institutional apparatus for the actualization of the ‘dual constitutional subject’ is 
already in place, in the form of European citizenship and institutions such as the European 
Parliament and the European Council. What is required is that these institutions embody 
the cognitive potential gathered in modern worldviews and consciousness structures by 
establishing a European-wide democratic ‘two-track’ decision-making process. One that 
enables individuals, both in their quality of European citizens, and of citizens of their 
respective national states, to participate – respectively in the Parliament and the Council 
– in the constitution of European law (Habermas, 2012: 28). This scenario implies that 
the ‘same persons’ will embody these two roles in ‘personal union’ and adopt ‘different 
justice perspectives’ depending on which of the two decision-making tracks is involved. 
What counts as a ‘public’ interest in deliberative processes that they undertake as citizens 
of a state, changes into a ‘particularistic’ interest in deliberative processes that they 
undertake as European citizens. (Habermas, 2012: 37). This tension arises from the dual 
character of the decision-making process and has important consequences for the 
democratic character of the European Union. 
On the one hand, it ensures that European law actually possesses democratic validity 
and can secure its compelling power to regulate inter-state relations, even in the absence 
of a European monopoly over the means of legitimate violence. Furthermore, it also 
extends the level of democratic control that European citizens are capable of exercising 
over the systemic contexts affecting the European continent – be it those of inter-state 
relations or those of the capitalist market. On the other hand, the fact that the dual 
constitutional subject of the EU is composed not only by European citizens, but also by 
the states of the Union, means that European law cannot be superimposed on national 
constitutional laws. Each state is capable of safeguarding its own internal legal and 
normative framework, by ensuring that European law must satisfy the standards of civil 
liberties that have already been historically achieved at the state level. Hence, European 
law embodies both the ‘universal’ orientations of European citizens and protects the 
‘difference’ of the several cultural biotypes of each one of the national peoples of the 
Union (Habermas, 2012: 40).  
The transformation of the European Union into a transnational democratic association of 
states and citizens would contribute to the actualisation of the new principle of 
organisation of world politics which is immanent in modern worldviews and consciousness 
structures. It would be a ‘further step’ in the political constitution of world society and in 
the democratization of world politics by permitting deliberative publics to acquire a 
greater degree of collective and conscious control over the systemic dynamics of inter-
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state and global economic relations, which have escaped their control within welfare 
states (Linklater, 1998: 167; Linklater, 2011).  
However, Habermas is well-aware that any such developments in the European Union 
are necessarily intertwined with wider dynamics of the international system and global 
capitalism and that the democratization of the transnational EU level can only be 
successful if framed in the wider democratization of world politics. The next section thus 
turns to how Habermas’s reflections on the EU are complemented by his work on the 
potential for the political constitutionalization of the supranational level of human 
interdependence. Namely, it considers his proposal for a reform of the United Nations as 
a condition for the expansion of democratic control over the global inter-state and 
capitalist systems that presently undermine human beings’ capacity to self-determine 
their conditions of existence. 
 
The cosmopolitan condition 
The goal of expanding democratic legal control over systemic contexts beyond national 
borders derives its impetus from a ‘paralysing constellation’ in world politics. The 
globalisation of human interdependence has ‘exhausted’ the capacity of states to answer 
to the problems posed by the global systemic forces of inter-state competition and 
capitalism that have developed beyond the control of even the most powerful states or 
unions of states (Habermas, 2012: 54). Hence, transnational efforts at democratic legal 
regulation, such as those of the European Union, must be complemented by the further 
democratization of world politics. Namely, via a reform of the United Nations that 
democratizes its role in the legal definition of the boundary conditions for the operation 
of inter-state relations and capitalist markets.  
According to Habermas (2006: 137), the democratic reform of the UN demands a 
transition to a 'cosmopolitan condition' in world politics, characterized by the 
'substitution' of international law by cosmopolitan law. Unlike current international law, 
cosmopolitan law would be the result of decision-making processes involving not only 
states, but also world citizens in their quality of constitutional subjects of the world 
organisation. The UN would thus have to institutionally embody the two innovations that 
Habermas sees as immanent in the transnational level of the EU. On the one hand, it 
would have to ensure the compliance of member states with cosmopolitan law even 
though the monopoly over the means of legitimate violence would remain at state level. 
On the other hand, it would have to institutionally embody a ‘dual constitutional subject’, 
composed of world citizens and national peoples; represented by their respective states, 
or by other representative entities, such as NGO’s, in the case of sub-state or stateless 
peoples (Habermas, 2012: 54).  
While the first of these two conditions can already be discerned in the institutional 
framework of the United Nations, the actualisation of the second element requires the 
attribution, to every single human being on the planet, of the status of world citizen, and 
the constitution, parallel with the General Assembly, of a ‘world parliament’ composed 
by their elected representatives (Habermas, 2012: 58; see parallels between Habermas’s 
proposal for world citizenship and those made by Apel (2007) who, however, lacks 
Habermas’ level of engagement with the institutional changes that might be required to 
actualize forms of world/cosmopolitan citizenship). The world parliament would not 
transform the United Nations into a world republic, but it would reinforce the democratic 
 JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations 
e-ISSN: 1647-7251 
Vol. 10, Nº. 1 (May-October 2019), pp. 14-28   
Jürgen Habermas and the democratization of world politics  
André Saramago 
 24 
 
legitimacy of cosmopolitan law by making world citizens, alongside with states, one of its 
constitutional subjects. In other words, in the same manner of what would take place in 
an EU transformed into a transnational democracy, cosmopolitan law would not 
superimpose itself on national constitutional law or ethno-national conceptions of the 
good life. Member-states, as the second constitution-founding subjects, would be able to 
protect their internal orders from cosmopolitan law that did not meet their standards of 
civil liberties (Habermas, 2012: 58). Furthermore, since the world organisation is not a 
world federation of states and does not possess a supranational monopoly over the 
means of legitimate violence, it would have to rely on ‘national monopolists’ for the 
fulfilment of its tasks, including those envisioning the implementation of coercive 
measures in order to reinstate compliance with cosmopolitan law. The need for the world 
organisation to rely on member-states in this manner not only confirms the decoupling 
between law and state power that characterizes the political constitution of world society, 
but also ensures the protection of the autonomy of states through the maintenance of 
the monopoly over the means of legitimate violence at the state level (Habermas, 2012: 
61). In this manner, the democratization of world politics envisaged by Habermas would 
effectively 'wed together' the Kantian ideal of equal membership of a universal kingdom 
of ends with the Marxian project of dismantling systems of domination and exclusion that 
undermine human autonomy by promoting new relations between universality and 
difference (Linklater, 1998). 
Essential in this regard, according to Habermas, is that the world organisation restrict 
itself to the tasks of maintaining peace and protecting human rights, leaving decision-
making processes related to economic, social or ecological problems to the transnational 
level of world society. The restriction of the UN to this narrow set of core functions derives 
from the argument that issues related to economic, social or ecological problems, while 
expressing a ‘shared abstract interest’ of all human beings, necessarily imply answers 
that relate to particular conceptions of the ‘good life’ (Habermas, 2012: 63). These are 
issues whose answers involve the self-affirmation of particular cultural and political 
identities and, as such, while admitting of consensualization between people who share 
common cultural characteristics as part of their collective history and belonging to a 
particular region of the globe, are not liable to truly universal answers arising from global 
processes of consensualization between world citizens. Consequently, these issues 
should be dealt with at the transnational level, where continental unions of states in the 
same cultural areas can potentially come closer to common agreements on preferable 
‘ways of life’ (Habermas, 2012: 63). However, the same judgement does not apply to 
issues of world peace and human rights. In Habermas’s (2012: 64) assessment, these 
issues express an a priori general interest shared by the world population, ‘beyond all 
political-cultural divisions’, in the avoidance of violence and in the expression of solidarity 
with ‘everything that has a human face’. These issues have an inherently universal 
character, to the extent that shared human vulnerability to war and violence is a common 
feature of the species (see: Linklater, 2011). As such, their discussion is liable to produce 
truly universal answers, arrived at through global processes of consensualization of 
norms involving world citizens and all the states into which humankind is divided. The 
world organisation must thus restrict itself to those issues that admit of universally 
shared human interest.    
According to Habermas, the universal, species-wide, character of the core functions of 
the UN also means that the world organisation has different legitimacy requirements than 
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the transnational level of continental unions. Given that ‘negative duties to refrain from 
unjustifiable human rights violations and wars of aggression are rooted in the core moral 
content of all the major world religions and in the cultures they have shaped’, global civic 
solidarity amongst world citizens can be based on these shared convictions and does not 
require a deeper collective commitment to a common conception of the ‘good life’, as 
occurs at the transnational level (Habermas, 2012: 65). Consequently, the democratic 
assessment of the deliberative decision-making processes of the world parliament can be 
based only on the ‘expression of the, in essence morally justified, “yes” or “no” to the 
supranational application of presumptively shared moral principles and norms’ 
(Habermas, 2012: 65). So, while the legitimacy of law at the transnational European 
level demands not only a dual constitutional subject but also the permanent consideration 
of transnational issues in a European public sphere, the weaker legitimacy requirements 
of cosmopolitan law do not demand the formation of a permanent global public sphere. 
They simply require the thematic and temporally circumscribed constitution of a global 
public ‘sparked intermittently by this or that major event without achieving structural 
permanence’ (Habermas, 2012: 62). 
 
Conclusion  
Habermas’s reflections on the possibility of democratization of world politics provide an 
important starting point to discuss how to deal with the erosion of the capacity of state-
bound democratic publics to control the social processes that bind them together at the 
global scale. In Habermas’s assessment, the answer to this erosion demands a new 
principle of organisation for world politics. One whose actualization lies immanent in the 
cognitive potential that has been gathered in modern consciousness structures by the 
long-term process of human development. According to Habermas, the cognitive 
potential of modernity implies the possibility of a decoupling between democracy and 
state power, on the basis of which the political constitution of world society can occur in 
a manner that would re-establish the balance between democratic politics and the 
systemic imperatives of global capital and inter-state relations. Habermas’s theory of 
social evolution thus provides a highly compelling approach to a critically-committed IR 
that seeks to fulfil its role as a means of orientation that is adequate to deal with the 
challenges posed by the complexity of human global interdependence. In other words, 
an IR that seeks to constitute itself as an orientating framework that can help people 
both acquire a better understanding of themselves and of their present historical context 
and identify what sort of international institutional innovations are required to actualize 
the immanent potential of modernity for a further expansion of human beings’ capacity 
to self-determine their conditions of existence.  
Habermas’s proposals, however, constitute only a starting point for the development of 
such an IR. Further works needs to be done, especially in better connecting Habermas’s 
philosophical-theoretical proposals with more concrete historical-sociological analyses of 
world politics. For example, it is debatable whether Habermas’s restriction of the tasks 
of the world organization to those of the maintenance of peace and human rights – under 
the argument that these tasks, unlike those related to economic, social and ecological 
problems, are more universal and less bound with particular conceptions of the good life 
– is completely tenable. The historical record shows that matters such as the 
maintenance of peace and human rights are as politicized and caught up with particular 
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conceptions of the good life as those related to economic, social and ecological problems. 
Sufficient evidence of this can be found in the numerous debates in the Security Council 
surrounding the legitimacy of international interventions in the name of the maintenance 
of peace or in recent debates about whether human rights, as currently conceived, are 
truly universal, or if their content is still expressive of a phase of predominance of 
Western powers in international society (see: Sun, 2016; Qi, 2005; Regilme, 2018) . 
Furthermore, recent developments in world politics have seen international organizations 
at the transnational level, such as the European Union or the African Union, assuming, 
or with the intention of assuming, a greater role at the level of the maintenance of peace 
and security in their respective areas of the globe (see: Joshua and Olanrewaju, 2017; 
Nováki, 2018). And finally, it is highly debatable whether problems that arise with 
economic, social and ecological interdependence can be adequately dealt with purely at 
the level of transnational continental unions, or whether these issues, especially in the 
context of increasingly out-of-control capitalist globalization and global climate change 
processes, do not require also at least some degree of global coordination; a coordination 
that would necessarily have to take place at the level of Habermas’s envisioned world 
organization. 
As such, Habermas’s critical approach to world politics needs to be further developed, 
namely through a deeper engagement with the historical-sociological study of world 
politics in order to disclose the actual existing immanent potentials for the development 
of the type of ‘cosmopolitan vision’ Habermas is seeking to nurture (see: Beck, 2006). 
Recent developments in critical international theory appear to be moving in this direction, 
either calling for the need for greater historical-sociological engagement (Schmide, 2018, 
Devetak, 2018), or seeking to develop it themselves (Linklater, 2016). It is up to 
contemporary and future scholars to complete this task and understand if, and how, 
Habermas’s ethical vision for the future of world politics might be actualized.   
 
References 
Apel, Karl-Otto (2001). «Discourse Ethics, Democracy and International Law: Toward a 
Globalization of Practical Reason». The American Journal of Economics and Sociology 
(66:1): 49-70. 
Beardsworh, Richard (2011). Cosmopolitanism and International Relations Theory. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Beck, Ulrich (2006). Cosmopolitan Vision. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
Dahl, Robert (1999). «Can International Organisation be Democratic? A Sceptic’s View». 
In Shapiro, Ian and Hacker-Cordon, Casiano (eds.) Democracy’s Edges. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 19-36. 
Devetak, Richard (2018). Critical International Theory: An Intellectual History. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
Fraser, Nancy (2007). «Transnationalising the Public Sphere: On the legitimacy and 
efficacy of public opinion in a post-Westphalian world». Theory, Culture and Society 
(24:4): 7-30. 
Grewal, Shivdeep (2001). «The Paradox of Integration: Habermas and the Unfinished 
Project of European Union». Politics (21:2): 114-123. 
 JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations 
e-ISSN: 1647-7251 
Vol. 10, Nº. 1 (May-October 2019), pp. 14-28   
Jürgen Habermas and the democratization of world politics  
André Saramago 
 27 
 
Habermas, Jürgen (1973). Legitimation Crisis. London: Heinemann. 
Habermas, Jürgen (1979). «History and Evolution». Telos (39): 5-44.  
Habermas, Jürgen (1987). The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2: Lifeworld and 
System – The Critique of Functionalist Reason. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Habermas, Jürgen (1996) Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory 
of Law and Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Habermas, Jürgen (2001). The Postnational Constellation. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Habermas, Jürgen (2006). The Divided West (Cambridge: Polity Press.  
Habermas, Jürgen (2006b). Times of Transition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Habermas, Jürgen (2012). The Crisis of the European Union: A Response. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
Haro, Fernando (2017). «The Decivilizing Effects of the Financial System». Human 
Figurations: Long-term perspectives on human development (6:2). 
Held, David (1995). Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to 
Cosmopolitan Governance. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Joshua, Segun and Olanrewaju, Faith (2017). «The AU’s Progress and Achievements in 
the Realm of Peace and Security». India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs 
(73:4): 454-471.  
Kant, Immanuel (1991). «Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch». In Hans Reiss (ed.) 
Kant: Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 93-130. 
Kant, Immanuel (2015). Critique of Practical Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Kleingeld, Pauline (2012). Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World-
Citizenship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Linklater, Andrew (1998). The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical 
Foundations of the PostWestphalian Era. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Linklater, Andrew (2007). «Public Spheres and Civilising Processes». Theory, Culture and 
Society (24:4): 31-37. 
Linklater, Andrew (2011). The Problem of Harm in World Politics: Theoretical 
investigations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Linklater, Andrew (2016). Violence and Civilization in the Western States-Systems. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
McCormick, John (2007). Weber, Habermas and the Transformation of the European 
State: Constitutional, Social and Supranational Democracy. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Mikalsen, Kjartan. (2011). «In Defense of Kant’s League of States». Law and Philosophy 
(30:3): 291-317. 
Nováky, Niklas (2018). «The EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation in defence: Keeping 
the Sleeping Beauty from snoozing». European View (17:1): 97-104. 
 JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations 
e-ISSN: 1647-7251 
Vol. 10, Nº. 1 (May-October 2019), pp. 14-28   
Jürgen Habermas and the democratization of world politics  
André Saramago 
 28 
 
Qi, Zhou (2005). «Conflicts over Human Rights between China and the US». Human 
Rights Quarterly (27:1): 105-124. 
Regilme, Salvador (2018). «The Global Human Politics of Human Rights: From Human 
Rights to Human Dignity?». International Political Science Review (40:2): 279-290. 
Schmide, David (2018). «The Poverty of Critical Theory in International Relations: 
Habermas, Linklater and the Failings of Cosmopolitan Theory». European Journal of 
International Relations (24:1): 198-220. 
Sun, Pinghua (2016). «Chinese Discourse on Human Rights in Global Governance». The 
Chinese Journal of Global Governance (1:2): 192-213. 
Verovšek, Peter. (2012). «Meeting Principles and Lifeworlds Halfway: Jürgen Habermas 
on the Future of Europe». Political Studies (60:2): 363-380. 
Walker, Rob (1988). One World, Many Worlds: Struggles for a Just World Peace. London: 
Zed Books. 
